Least Privilege. Continuously Enforced.
Coordinate every identity, credential, and integration. Surface risky access paths and secure them in one click.
Before someone else does.
Hackers don’t hack in. They login.
Stale human access
You disable their Okta, but their active GitHub tokens, Slack sessions, and AWS keys stay live for months. We surface the ghosts.
Overprivileged workloads
A simple frontend EKS pod is running with an attached AWS role that has permissions to read database secrets. We map the paths bypassing your IdP.
Shadow integrations
Developers connect external AI tools via Google or Microsoft OAuth. If that third-party SaaS is compromised, attackers get a persistent path to read your codebase.
of breaches used valid credentials
— Verizon DBIR 2024
avg. detection time for an identity breach
— IBM Cost of a Breach 2024
to walk in with a leaked token
Every breach below used access that already existed.
No new exploits. Just credentials, tokens, and OAuth grants that were already valid.
An employee's OAuth grant to a third-party AI tool gave attackers two months of access to production secrets, source code, and API tokens.
An Iran-linked group gained access to Active Directory and used Microsoft Intune to push wiper payloads to managed endpoints. Manufacturing operations were disrupted for days.
A stolen service account opened Okta's customer support system, then downstream customer session tokens fell next.
Long-lived credentials harvested by infostealers were used against accounts that did not enforce multi-factor authentication.
Malware on an engineer's laptop captured a valid session token with broad access. Every secret stored by every customer had to be rotated.
A senior engineer's home device gave access to the development environment where master encryption keys lived.
An employee's OAuth grant to a third-party AI tool gave attackers two months of access to production secrets, source code, and API tokens.
An Iran-linked group gained access to Active Directory and used Microsoft Intune to push wiper payloads to managed endpoints. Manufacturing operations were disrupted for days.
A stolen service account opened Okta's customer support system, then downstream customer session tokens fell next.
Long-lived credentials harvested by infostealers were used against accounts that did not enforce multi-factor authentication.
Malware on an engineer's laptop captured a valid session token with broad access. Every secret stored by every customer had to be rotated.
A senior engineer's home device gave access to the development environment where master encryption keys lived.
An employee's OAuth grant to a third-party AI tool gave attackers two months of access to production secrets, source code, and API tokens.
An Iran-linked group gained access to Active Directory and used Microsoft Intune to push wiper payloads to managed endpoints. Manufacturing operations were disrupted for days.
A stolen service account opened Okta's customer support system, then downstream customer session tokens fell next.
Long-lived credentials harvested by infostealers were used against accounts that did not enforce multi-factor authentication.
Malware on an engineer's laptop captured a valid session token with broad access. Every secret stored by every customer had to be rotated.
A senior engineer's home device gave access to the development environment where master encryption keys lived.
Valid OAuth tokens from a connected chat app let attackers query Salesforce instances across hundreds of customers. No vulnerability needed.
A phished BPO contractor's account held permissions to export the entire support ticket dataset in a single query.
After the Okta breach, Cloudflare rotated 5,000 credentials. One missed service token reached their internal Atlassian environment.
A password spray on a legacy test tenant found an OAuth app with privileged access to corporate mail. Executive inboxes were read for weeks.
After buying a contractor's credential, attackers used MFA fatigue to log in, then found a PowerShell script with hard-coded admin secrets.
Phished employee credentials reached customer data and downstream services including Signal and Authy.
Valid OAuth tokens from a connected chat app let attackers query Salesforce instances across hundreds of customers. No vulnerability needed.
A phished BPO contractor's account held permissions to export the entire support ticket dataset in a single query.
After the Okta breach, Cloudflare rotated 5,000 credentials. One missed service token reached their internal Atlassian environment.
A password spray on a legacy test tenant found an OAuth app with privileged access to corporate mail. Executive inboxes were read for weeks.
After buying a contractor's credential, attackers used MFA fatigue to log in, then found a PowerShell script with hard-coded admin secrets.
Phished employee credentials reached customer data and downstream services including Signal and Authy.
Valid OAuth tokens from a connected chat app let attackers query Salesforce instances across hundreds of customers. No vulnerability needed.
A phished BPO contractor's account held permissions to export the entire support ticket dataset in a single query.
After the Okta breach, Cloudflare rotated 5,000 credentials. One missed service token reached their internal Atlassian environment.
A password spray on a legacy test tenant found an OAuth app with privileged access to corporate mail. Executive inboxes were read for weeks.
After buying a contractor's credential, attackers used MFA fatigue to log in, then found a PowerShell script with hard-coded admin secrets.
Phished employee credentials reached customer data and downstream services including Signal and Authy.
Connects to where your identities and data already live.
Read-only OAuth or IAM roles, no agent to install, about ten minutes per system.